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PANETTI v. QUARTERMAN: 
RAISING THE BAR AGAINST 
EXECUTING THE INCOMPETENT 
D.G. MAXTED* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court in Panetti v. Quarterman1 held 
that the Constitution2 forbids executing a mentally ill prisoner who 
cannot rationally understand the reason for the execution.3 In a 
decision hailed for better aligning law with medical science,4 the Court 
halted the execution of Scott Panetti, a severely ill Texas death row 
inmate who believes “that his imminent execution [is] part of a 
satanic conspiracy to prevent him from preaching the Gospel.”5 
Notably, the Court in Panetti created an exception to the bar against 
second federal habeas corpus applications, raised the bar against 
executing the incompetent, and continued a trend narrowing the class 
of persons constitutionally eligible for execution. 
 
 * 2009 J.D. and M.A. Candidate, Duke University School of Law and Department of 
Philosophy. 
 1. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, XIV § 1. 
 3. Panetti, 127  S. Ct. at 2861–62. 
 4. See Todd J. Gillman and Diane Jennings, Justices Block Execution of Texas Killer, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 29, 2007, at 6A (quoting Ronald Honberg of the National 
Alliance on Mental Illness as stating that “[f]or once, law has caught up with medical science”).  
Several amicus briefs were filed on behalf of Panetti indicating the support of the medical 
establishment.  See Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, American 
Psychiatric Association, and National Alliance on Mental Illness in Support of Petitioner, 
Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407); Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner on Behalf of National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. 
Ct. 2842 (2007) (No.06-6407). 
 5. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407). 
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II.  A HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 
The Panetti v. Quarterman opinion must be understood in the 
context of petitioner Scott Panetti’s long history of severe mental 
illness, and the courts’ failure to deal with him humanely or 
effectively. Panetti’s counsel argued that the setting of an execution 
date exacerbated his already deeply-held paranoid belief in an 
“apocalyptic struggle with the devil.”6 But these delusions did not 
emerge from a vacuum: “[e]vidence of incompetency runs like a 
fissure through every proceeding in this case.”7 
Panetti showed signs of mental illness as a teenager, and his 
condition worsened over the years, resulting in over a dozen 
hospitalizations.8 Once, Panetti’s wife committed him after he 
performed “a ceremony to get rid of the devil during what he called 
the ‘devil’s birthday,’” burying the family’s valuables in the yard and 
piling furnishings outside to cleanse them of the devil with water.9 
After his wife separated from him, Panetti stopped taking 
antipsychotic medication. Shortly thereafter, he “shaved his head, 
dressed in camouflage combat fatigues, armed himself with a sawed-
off shotgun and a deer rifle . . . and shot [his in-laws] at close range 
with the rifle in front of his wife and daughter.”10 
An absurd, tragic circus-trial ensued.11 Seven months after being 
found competent to stand trial despite serious questions about his 
sanity,12 Panetti experienced his “‘April Fool’s day revelation’ that 
God had cured him of his schizophrenia,” and he again quit taking 
medication and asked to represent himself at trial.13 Despite Panetti’s 
obvious and serious illness, Judge Stephen B. Able granted Panetti’s 
 
 6. Id. at 19. 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. Id. at 7 n.14 (noting Panetti was “hospitalized over a dozen times in numerous 
institutions for schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, psychosis, 
auditory hallucinations, and delusions of persecution and grandiosity”). 
 9. Id. at 20 n.13. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
 11. See, e.g., Online Documentary:  Executing the Insane:  The Case of Scott Panetti 
(Texas Defender Service 2007), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/TDSStory.asp?ID=1 
(providing first-hand accounts of the trial). 
 12. A second jury found Panetti competent after his first competency trial, reportedly at a 
9-3 split in favor of finding incompetency, was declared a mistrial.  Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.6, 
Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407). 
 13. Id at 10–11. 
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pro se representation request.14 Panetti pled not guilty by reason of 
insanity, telling the jury in his opening statement that only an insane 
person could prove insanity.15 
Panetti’s self-representation was disastrous. He subpoenaed John 
F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus, along with 200 others.16 He dressed 
each day in a “Tom Mix” cowboy outfit complete with purple shirt, 
leather pants tucked into his cowboy boots, bandana around his neck, 
and a “big cowboy hat that hung on a string over his back.”17 He 
consistently ignored Judge Able’s orders, and incoherently fixated on 
irrelevant issues.18 Damningly, Panetti testified as “Sarge”—the 
militaristic persona who supposedly committed the murders.19 He 
engaged in an “often brutal cross-examination of his estranged wife, 
Sonja, forcing her to relive the murders in graphic detail.” The jury 
convicted Panetti on September 21, 1995, and, primarily because they 
were “terrified” of his performance, sentenced him to death the next 
day.20 
Review of the trial verdict in Texas courts yielded no relief.21 In a 
federal habeas petition, Panetti, now represented by counsel, 
contested the reasonableness of the finding of competency to stand 
trial and the court’s approval of pro se representation. In upholding 
the District Court affirmation of the trial verdict, the Fifth Circuit 
found that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable.22 Using 
head-spinning logic, the court declared that because Panetti could 
“formulate a trial strategy” by pleading not guilty by reason of 
insanity, he was therefore sane and had a rational understanding of 
the proceedings.23 So in this view, an insane pro se defendant finds 
 
 14. See Ralph Blumenthal, Justices Block Execution of Delusional Texas Killer, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A25. 
 15. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407). 
 16. Id. at 11–12.  Panetti later recanted the subpoena of Jesus because “Jesus Christ, he 
doesn’t need a subpoena. He’s right here with me, and we’ll get into that.” Id. 
 17. Id. at 11 n.9. 
 18. During examination of a witness’s opinion on belt buckles—the relevance of which 
Judge Able questioned—Panetti said that “it has to do with the difference between a rodeo 
hand and a buckaroo poet . . . .  At rodeos cowboys make sure they look at your buckle without 
you looking at it.” Id. at 13. 
 19. Id. at 14. 
 20. Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.9, Panetti, 127  S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407). 
 21. In a harsh irony, just two months after being sentenced to death, Panetti was found 
incompetent to waive habeas counsel, and his request to waive direct appeal was rejected. Id. at 
15 n.10. 
 22. Panetti v. Cockrell, 73 F. App’x 78, 2003 WL 21756365, at *4 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 23. Id. at *4. 
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himself in a Catch-22 that precludes insanity: if the defendant’s claim 
is insanity, then he has a trial strategy and is therefore sane; but if the 
defendant does not raise an insanity defense, then that claim is 
obviously foreclosed. 
III.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Scott Panetti came within hours of lethal injection. With direct and 
collateral review complete on October 31, 2003, an execution date was 
set for February 5, 2004.24 On December 10, 2003, counsel for Panetti 
filed a motion alleging incompetency to be executed under Texas state 
law, which was rejected by the trial court without a hearing.25 As a 
result, Panetti’s counsel requested a stay of execution in federal court 
and petitioned for writ of habeas corpus.26 In light of evidence of 
Panetti’s deteriorated mental condition,27 the day before his scheduled 
lethal injection the District Court stayed Panetti’s execution on 
February 4 pending further consideration in state court.28 
In what became key to Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Panetti v. 
Quarterman, Judge Able behaved injudiciously when he reconsidered 
the competency finding. Panetti filed ten motions for Judge Able’s 
consideration, including requesting funding for a mental health expert 
evaluation.29 Judge Able denied two motions and said he would rule 
on the rest if two court-appointed experts found Panetti competent.30 
Counsel filed a motion to reconsider this decision.31 The judge not 
only failed to rule on this motion to reconsider, he also failed to 
rule—as explicitly promised—on the remaining motions after the 
state-appointed experts found Panetti competent.32 Without further 
explanation, the judge then concluded that Panetti had “`to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is incompetent to be 
 
 24. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407). 
 25. Id.  Under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05(a), “[a] person who is incompetent 
to be executed may not be executed.” 
 26. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407). 
 27. Dr. Mark Cunningham, a clinical and forensic psychologist, and Law Professor David 
Dow, a post-conviction capital attorney, visited Panetti and concluded he suffered from 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder.  Brief for Petitioner at 19–20, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 
(No. 06-6407). 
 28. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407). 
 29. Id. at 2–3. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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executed.’”33 Because state law precluded appeal of this decision, 
Panetti’s counsel pursued habeas relief in federal court.34  
The District Court applied the Fifth Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation of the Ford v. Wainwright standard to find Panetti 
competent to be executed.35 In Ford, the Supreme Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids executing the incompetent.36 Applying the 
standard announced in Ford, the District Court noted that under 
circuit precedent “all we require is ‘that a person know the fact of his 
impending execution and the reason for it.’”37 That is, so long as the 
condemned knows that he committed the crime, knows that the 
government is going to execute him, and knows that there is at least a 
pretext linking the two, he can be executed. As a result, delusions of 
the kind Panetti claims to experience, “even those which may result in 
a fundamental failure to appreciate the connection between the 
petitioner’s crime and his execution,” are irrelevant under the Fifth 
Circuit standard.38 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.39 
IV.  LEGAL CONTEXT 
A. The Right Not To Be Executed While Incompetent 
The Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright40 made two central 
holdings in blocking the execution of Alvin Ford. First, Justice 
Marshall writing for a majority held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits executing an insane prisoner. Second, Justice Powell in a 
controlling aspect of his concurrence held that under the Fourteenth 
 
 33. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407) (quoting JA at 99). 
 34. Id. at 4 n.2 (noting that Texas courts only review a finding of incompetence) (citing Ex 
parte Caldwell, 58 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). 
 35. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 36. Id. at 409–10. 
 37. Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F.Supp.2d 702, 709 (W.D. Tex., 2004) (quoting Fearance v. Scott, 
56 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Barnard v. Collins, 13 F.3d 871, 876 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 38. Id. at 712. 
 39. Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 821 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that because the standard 
requires only awareness and not rational understanding, no inquiry beyond a finding of 
awareness is necessary), cert. granted, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 852 (mem.) (2007). 
 40. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  The Court found unconstitutional a 
competency determination made by the Governor of Florida, who had considered only the 
testimony of state-appointed psychiatrists.  Id. at 403–04. 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner’s interest in not being 
executed while insane cannot be deprived without a fair hearing.41 
Writing for five Justices, Justice Marshall established the 
substantive right not to be executed while insane,42 firmly locating it in 
our common law heritage and the “natural abhorrence” felt towards 
executing the insane that “is evidently shared across this Nation.”43 
Though he noted a number of justifications,44 an essential reason was 
the lack of retributive value in “executing a person who has no 
comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his 
fundamental right to life.”45 
Though joining the majority’s holding on the substantive right, 
Justice Powell wrote separately to define more narrowly the Due 
Process requirement for determining competency to be executed. 
Because his opinion is narrower on this point, it is controlling in this 
respect.46 Justice Powell held generally that Due Process requires 
“fundamental fairness” that may differ with the circumstances.47 In 
Ford, Alvin Ford had been deprived of at least 1) an “impartial” 
decision-maker48 and 2) an “opportunity to be heard.”49 Justice Powell 
appeared particularly irked by the fact that the finding of competency 
was made “solely on the basis of the examinations performed by 
state-appointed psychiatrists,” and that Ford had no chance to rebut 
this with his own expert testimony.50 
B. Federal Habeas Law 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may grant 
 
 41. Infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 42. Justice Marshall performed the three-part Eighth Amendment analysis.  Ford, 477 U.S. 
at 405–06 (examining (1) original intent (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 28586 (1983)); (2) 
the “evolving standards that mark the progress of a maturing society,” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); and (3) “objective evidence of contemporary values,” (citing Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977))). 
 43. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401, 409 (citing twenty six states with statutes that bar executing the 
incompetent). 
 44. Justice Marshall noted that executing the insane “simply offends humanity;” that it 
serves no deterrent value; that insanity prevents a prisoner from assisting his defense; and that 
“madness is its own punishment.”  Id. at 407–09. 
 45. Id. at 409. 
 46. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 47. Ford, 477 U.S. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 48. Id. at 427. 
 49. Id. at 424 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)). 
 50. Id. 
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habeas relief regarding a state court’s adjudication of a claim on the 
merits in two narrowly-defined situations.”51 AEDPA generally limits 
petitioners to one bite at the apple, providing that “[a] claim 
presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under § 
2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed,” 
unless it meets one of two narrow exceptions.52 Yet the Court has not 
always literally applied this bar to “second or successive” applications. 
Two cases reveal the Court’s willingness to interpret § 2244 
creatively in situations where it seems necessary. In Stewart v. 
Martinez-Villareal,53 the Court held that a prisoner’s previously 
dismissed Ford claim could be re-opened upon ripening at a later 
date. Though the claim was re-opened, the Court reasoned that there 
was still only one application for relief, thus keeping the decision 
within the language of § 2244.54 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a 
contrary holding would create perverse implications because either 
state courts would be forced to rule on Ford claims prematurely or 
prisoners would be forced to foreclose their Ford claims.55 The Court 
sought to avoid an interpretation of AEDPA that would result in no 
review of a prisoner’s viable constitutional claim.56 Through similar 
reasoning, in Slack v. McDaniel,57 the Court held that a literal second § 
2254 application is not “second or successive” when the petitioner’s 
first application was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.58 
Thus, in each instance the Court stretched the meaning of § 2244 
without explicitly excepting to it. 
V.  HOLDING 
 In reversing the Fifth Circuit, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Court, made three central holdings in Panetti v. Quarterman.59 First, 
the Court held it had jurisdiction over Panetti’s claim because “[t]he 
 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2008).  These two situations are if it “resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2008). 
 53. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998). 
 54. Id. at 643. 
 55. Id. at 644. 
 56. Id. at 645. 
 57. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). 
 58. Id. at 486. 
 59. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2848 (2007) (opinion by Kennedy, J., joined by 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.J. Dissenting opinion by Thomas, J., joined by 
Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Alito, J.J.). 
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statutory bar on ‘second or successive’ applications does not apply to 
a Ford claim brought in an application filed when the claim is first 
ripe.”60 Second, the Court held that the state court failed to provide 
Panetti even “rudimentary process” in determining his competency to 
be executed, in violation of Supreme Court law as annunciated in 
Ford v. Wainwright, so that no deference is due the state court finding 
of competency.61 Third, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit 
interpretation of Ford is “too restrictive to afford a prisoner the 
protections granted by the Eighth Amendment.”62 
A. Jurisdiction 
The first holding carved a novel exception into AEDPA’s bar 
against “second or successive” habeas applications.63 Noting that 
“[t]he phrase ‘second or successive’ is not self-defining,” the Court 
discussed case-law, practicality, the interests of habeas petitioners, and 
AEDPA’s purposes in order to define it.64 Though Justice Kennedy 
invoked the reasoning of Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal and Slack v. 
McDaniel, neither case addressed Panetti’s situation65—and Martinez-
Villareal explicitly denied that it covered a claim brought in a second 
application for the first time upon ripening.66 Whereas in Martinez-
Villareal a second application was allowed because it reopened a 
previously unripe claim, Panetti raised no Ford claim in his initial 
habeas application that could be reopened. So although those cases 
expanded the meaning of “second or successive,” Justice Kennedy 
here simply concluded that § 2244 was not meant to apply to Panetti’s 
Ford claim. 
As in Martinez-Villareal and Slack, the Court recognized the need 
“to look to the ‘implications for habeas practice’ when interpreting § 
2244.”67 Practically, barring Panetti’s claim would require habeas 
petitioners to bring Ford claims in their initial habeas application, 
 
 60. Id. at 2855. 
 61. Id. at 2858. 
 62. Id. at 2860. 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2008).  Panetti’s application did not meet either of the explicit 
exceptions to this bar.  See id., § 2244(b)(2)(A-B). 
 64. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2853. 
 65. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 645 (holding that re-opened Ford claim is not a 
“second or successive” application); Slack, 529 U.S. at 486 (holding a second application 
brought after dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies is not “second or successive”). 
 66. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 645 n* (noting the decision does not address the 
situation of a Ford claim brought for the first time in a second application). 
 67. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2860 (quoting Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S at 644). 
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which could be years before an execution date is even set. These Ford 
claims would thus be ritually dismissed as unripe, only to be reopened 
under Martinez-Villareal if the claim ripened upon the setting of an 
execution date. But since a condemned inmate’s mental state can 
deteriorate over time, every conscientious capital habeas attorney 
would have to file a Ford claim to plan for this contingency. Such an 
“empty formality . . . neither respects the limited legal resources 
available to the States, nor encourages the exhaustion of state 
remedies.”68 
Thus, despite plain statutory language, the Court concluded that 
“Congress did not intend the . . . ‘second or successive’ [bar] to govern 
. . . a § 2254 application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim filed 
as soon as that claim is ripe.”69 Supporting this conclusion are the 
general purposes of AEDPA to “‘further the principles of comity, 
finality, and federalism.’”70 Those purposes take on added salience 
when aligned with the interests of capital habeas petitioners, as in 
Panetti’s case.71 The Court refused a procedurally and practically 
problematic interpretation of § 2244 that “‘would close [its] doors to a 
class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication 
that such was Congress’s intent.’”72 
B. Due Process 
In the second holding, Justice Kennedy ruled that the state court’s 
procedures for determining competency violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Since Panetti met the threshold showing of 
incompetency, under Ford he was entitled to a fair hearing.73 In 
applying Justice Powell’s basic standard in Ford, the Court found that 
the “state court failed to provide petitioner with a constitutionally 
adequate opportunity to be heard.”74 
Panetti’s inability to rebut the testimony of court-appointed 
psychiatrists primarily led to this conclusion, but Justice Kennedy also 
seemed bothered by the conduct of the state judge. As in Ford, the 
 
 68. Id. at 2854. 
 69. Id. at 2853. 
 70. Id. at 2854 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockerell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 380–81 (2003)). 
 73. Id. at 2856 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986)). 
 74. Id. at 2858. 
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finding of competency in Panetti’s case was erroneously based solely 
on the testimony of court-appointed experts.75 But Justice Kennedy 
noted a number of other failings,76 including that Judge Able 
repeatedly “conveyed information to petitioner’s counsel that turned 
out not to be true.”77 In other words, the judge lied to Panetti’s 
counsel. Because these failings violated the clear mandate of Ford, the 
Court moved to the substantive claim at the heart of Panetti’s 
petition. 
C. The Constitution Forbids Executing the Incompetent 
In the third holding, the Court held that the Fifth Circuit standard 
is “too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by the 
Eighth Amendment.”78 Plentiful evidence indicates that Panetti 
suffers severe delusions that have “recast [his] execution as ‘part of 
spiritual warfare . . . between the demons and the forces of the 
darkness and God and the angels and the forces of light.’”79 In 
determining whether these delusions could render Panetti legally 
incompetent, Justice Kennedy turned to the established reasons not to 
execute the incompetent. 
Though Ford enunciated no definitive standard for incompetency, 
Justice Kennedy applied the bar against executing the incompetent 
focused through the lens of Ford’s reasoning that executing the insane 
lacks retributive value. Severe delusions may render a condemned 
prisoner unable to comprehend the personal and community-oriented 
retributive goals of his execution.80 This calls into question whether 
the impending execution can induce the offender’s recognition of his 
offense in order to generate vindication of the community’s norms.81 
The basic principle of retribution is thus put at risk by the Fifth 
Circuit test, which improperly forecloses inquiry into whether the 
condemned has the capacity for “rational understanding.”82 
 
 75. Although one major difference is that in Ford the Governor controlled the competency 
hearing.  See Ford, 477 U.S. at 403–04. 
 76. These include failing to transcribe the proceedings, and potentially violating state law 
by not holding a competency hearing. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2856–57 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN., art. 46.05(k)). 
 77. Id. at 2857. 
 78. Id. at 2860. 
 79. Id. at 2859. 
 80. Id. at 2861. 
 81. Id. at 2861–62. 
 82. Id. 
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In tentatively describing the margins of incompetence, Justice 
Kennedy made two implicit distinctions. First, he distinguished 
between the condemned’s “awareness of the State’s rationale” as 
opposed to a “rational understanding” of the reasons for execution.83 
The condemned must be aware not only of his crime and impending 
execution, but also that he is being executed as a retributive response 
to that crime. Second, he distinguished between unfounded delusions 
and those grounded in a diagnosable illness, emphasizing that the 
source of Panetti’s delusions “is not a misanthropic personality or an 
amoral character. It is a psychotic disorder.”84 So a determination of 
incompetence should consider both whether the condemned lacks the 
capacity to rationally understand the retributive purpose of execution, 
and whether the source of that incapacity is a severe mental illness. 
Yet, Justice Kennedy explicitly declined to create a standard 
governing competency or to determine Panetti’s incompetence based 
on an incomplete record.85 Instead, the Court remanded for 
exploration of the facts supporting Pannetti’s claim that were not 
considered under the erroneous Fifth Circuit standard.86 In that 
regard, the Court recommended expert testimony to clarify the scope 
of the delusions.87 The Court’s recent Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence should guide the lower court’s inquiry.88 
VI.  ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In the view of one commentator, Panetti v. Quarterman is “a long 
opinion that says very little.”89 Though important and potentially far-
reaching, the opinion skirts establishing any clearly defined standards. 
Consequently, Panetti offers fertile soil for capital litigation, and 
below I explore the meaning of each holding as a forecast of potential 
implications. 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2862. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2863. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–64 (2005) (holding executing juveniles 
unconstitutional), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–14 (2002) (holding executing the 
mentally retarded unconstitutional)). 
 89. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, in conversation with the author. 
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A. Defining the Standard of Competency To Be Executed 
Panetti raises the bar against executing the incompetent. Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Panetti usefully clarifies this by noting that the 
majority opinion “can be understood only as holding for the first time 
that the Eighth Amendment requires ‘rational understanding’” for 
competency to be executed.90 Though Justice Kennedy omitted 
explicitly defining a standard for rational understanding, the 
conclusion that the Fifth Circuit erroneously precluded inquiry into 
whether Panetti had rational understanding only makes sense as 
positively requiring it for a prisoner to be found competent.91 The best 
reading of the opinion points toward a finding of incompetency if a 
petitioner lacks the capacity to rationally understand the reason for 
his execution, and if the source of that incapacity is a severe mental 
illness. 
The contours of this standard will likely be fleshed out in several 
ways. First, on remand, the District Court will hold an evidentiary 
hearing regarding “whether and to what extent Panetti’s present 
mental state renders him incapable of understanding the reason for 
his punishment.”92 This will mean defining and implementing a 
standard consistent with Panetti’s mandate. Second, left open is 
whether a condemned prisoner, once found incompetent under 
Panetti, may still be executed if competency is restored. One view 
holds that the death sentence of an incompetent prisoner should 
automatically default to the alternative sentence to execution, likely 
life without possibility of parole.93 
Third, Panetti begs the question whether forcibly medicating a 
condemned prisoner to render him competent is constitutional. The 
government may not forcibly medicate a defendant solely for the 
purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial, except in rare 
 
 90. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2874 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 91. This reading of Panetti is supported by Justice Kennedy’s view that a singular concept 
of competency should apply to each stage of criminal proceedings.  See Godinez v. Moran, 509 
U.S. 389, 403 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing requirements of both a factual and 
rational understanding of the proceedings for competency to exist). 
 92. Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2007) (order 
scheduling evidentiary hearing for Feb. 5, 2008). 
 93. See ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, Recommendation 
and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 668 (Sept.–Oct. 2006). 
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instances meeting a narrow standard.94 Yet, the Court denied 
certiorari to an Eighth Circuit case permitting forcible medication to 
render a prisoner competent to be executed.95 So left open is whether 
the high value placed on retribution in Panetti informs this discussion. 
In my opinion, it does. There is something paradoxical and 
unpalatable in propping up an otherwise incompetent prisoner solely 
to execute him under the semblance of competency.96 For if, according 
to Justice Kennedy, retribution presupposes a theory of rational 
choice by which the condemned comes to “recognize at last the 
gravity of his crime,” then the use of medication to achieve this end 
undermines the penitential impact punishment ostensibly provokes.97 
B. Implications of Panetti Beyond Execution Competency 
Panetti’s reasoning precluding application of the death penalty 
when it would not serve retributive purposes applies to other post-
conviction situations involving incompetency. The first involves a 
condemned prisoner who wishes to “volunteer” for execution by 
terminating post-conviction proceedings, when that prisoner would be 
incompetent under Panetti. The retributive importance of having the 
capacity to rationally understand the reasons for execution obviously 
extends to ensuring that the issue be raised. In this situation, next 
friend petitions, submitted by qualifying third parties on behalf of the 
condemned, should be permitted by courts.98 Second, under a similar 
rationale, proceedings should be stayed or terminated against a 
prisoner who lacks the capacity to assist post-conviction defense 
adequately.99 
 
 94. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (holding forcible medication allowable 
only if treatment is medically appropriate; is substantially unlikely to produce side-effects 
adversely affecting the trial; is not too intrusive; and is necessary to further important 
government interests). 
 95. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 96. At least one state prohibits forcible medication drawing on retribution principles.  See 
State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 747 (La. 1992) (holding that forcible medication to produce 
competency “fails to measurably contribute to the social goals of capital punishment”). 
 97. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2861 (2007). 
 98. See ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, supra note 93, at 
668. 
 99. Id. 
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C. Finding AEDPA Exceptions 
On the jurisdictional holding, the Court’s novel exception to 
AEDPA is enough to tingle legal realists and pragmatists, for the 
Court simply rejected plain language in favor of logical and practical 
coherence. There is a limit to how far a judge can stretch language 
with a straight face, and the Justices seemed unwilling to use the “silly 
fiction” of Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal either to eliminate Panetti’s 
claim, or to expand the definition of “second or successive” any 
further.100 Instead, they simply read an additional exception into § 
2244. 
At least two implications result. First and most obviously, capital 
habeas petitioners can raise a Ford claim in a completely separate 
application upon ripening with the setting of an execution date. 
Second, the logic of Panetti may lead habeas corpus attorneys to 
propose additional claims that ripen after a first petition. For instance, 
challenging execution methods may only ripen after setting an 
execution date, so a § 2254 claim that a particular execution technique 
violates the Eighth Amendment might also warrant an exception to 
the second or successive bar.101 Likewise, an inmate’s claim that too 
long a tenure on death row violates the Constitution may only ripen 
after an extended time passes.102 
D. Injudicious Courts and Inadequate Process 
The Court’s holding that the state failed to provide adequate 
procedures in determining competency is primarily interesting in the 
context of what is best described as a Supreme Court smack-down of 
both Fifth Circuit and Texas state court death penalty decisions. The 
Court does invite litigation over whether the entitlement to rebut the 
 
 100. This is how Justice Souter described Martinez-Villareal at oral argument, responding to 
the government’s argument that claims must be raised and reopened.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 27–28, Panetti, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407) (“Yes, but that’s a silly fiction.  
You’re not reopening a claim.  We can use any kind of language we want.  The fact is when he 
first raised it he didn’t have a claim which bore a close enough relationship to the time of 
execution.”). 
 101. This presumes that clearly established law supports the claim sufficient to meet 
AEDPA.  See, e.g., Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting § 2254 claim 
because no clearly established Supreme Court law generally prohibits lethal injection). 
 102. There is some support for such a claim.  See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421 
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting to denial of cert.); Elledge v. Florida, 119 S. Ct. 366, 366 (1998) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of cert. because petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim is “a 
serious one”). 
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state’s psychiatric evidence includes the right to state funds to hire an 
expert.103 But beyond that, the Ford procedural standard as defined by 
Justice Powell is left intact as a dynamic test requiring fundamental 
fairness. So, more notable is the Court’s apparent annoyance at the 
conduct of the Texas judiciary—even going so far as to imply that 
Texas Judge Stephen Able lied to Panetti’s counsel.104 Given four 
other reversals of Texas death penalty decisions in the past term 
alone, at least five members of the Court appear short on patience 
with judicial indiscretion and antagonism towards capital defendants 
and petitioners.105 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Panetti v. Quarterman reinforces trends in capital jurisprudence. In 
line with decisions prohibiting the execution of juveniles and the 
mentally retarded,106 it reveals the Court’s willingness to individualize 
sentencing in the criminal process107—to weigh in on whom, as 
opposed to what, we can punish with execution. More probingly, in 
focusing on the rational capacity of an individual condemned 
prisoner, Panetti invites reconsideration of whether one can ever 
sufficiently generalize his mental state. That is, examining the context 
of an individual’s state of mind means considering its causes and 
consequences. Looking within and beyond the individual in this way 
contextualizes the concept of rational individual choice that is often 
imagined abstractly. This appeal to causation, combined with the 
epistemic impossibility of knowing if we judge rationality 
accurately—even for prisoners not diagnosed as mentally ill—casts 
doubt on the legitimacy of the ultimate punishment of death, if indeed 
 
 103. See Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2855 (noting that Panetti was entitled to “adequate means by 
which to submit expert psychiatric evidence” rebutting state’s evidence) (emphasis added). 
 104. See id. at 2857. 
 105. See Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007) (holding that a Texas court’s failure to allow 
jury to fully consider mitigating evidence was not harmless error, and remanding for new 
sentencing hearing); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007) (reversing 5th Circuit 
because the jury was not allowed to fully consider mitigating evidence as mandated by prior 
Court cases); Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007) (reversing 5th Circuit because 
jury in Texas case was not allowed to fully consider mitigating evidence); Chambers v. 
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2126 (2007) (remanded to the Fifth Circuit in light of Brewer v. 
Quarterman). 
 106. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–64 (2005) (holding executing juveniles 
unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–14 (2002) (holding executing the 
mentally retarded unconstitutional). 
 107. Professor Michael Tigar pointed this out in conversation with the author. 
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that legitimacy depends on finding that the condemned’s mental state 
is objectively rational, and is his alone. 
 
